On the Power of Balance: A Remembrance of Justice Potter Stewart by Borgersen, Ellen
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 13
Number 2 Winter 1986 Article 2
1-1-1986
On the Power of Balance: A Remembrance of
Justice Potter Stewart
Ellen Borgersen
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ellen Borgersen, On the Power of Balance: A Remembrance of Justice Potter Stewart, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. 173 (1986).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol13/iss2/2
On the Power of Balance: A
Remembrance of Justice Potter Stewart
By Ellen Borgersen*
Justice Stewart's decision to retire in 1981 took most of us by sur-
prise at first, but his characteristically quotable explanation-that it was
"better to go too soon than to stay too long"---captured the great wis-
dom of his choice. It was, as Vice President Bush observes, such a "well
balanced" decision,' rooted in his deep commitment to both Court and
family. What he taught us, I think, is that only a sane, whole human
being can serve the Constitution and the law3 really well. Such a being
has other fish to catch at age 66;4 and so he went.
His retirement was the occasion for an outpouring of tributes and
reflections on his work as a judge,5 in all of which one hears a remarkably
consistent theme: he was "a lawyer's lawyer, a judge's judge,"'6 a "prin-
cipled pragmatist"7 who defied stereotyping of any kind,' particularly
along the "liberal/conservative" or "activist/passivist" axes that he both
considered and demonstrated to be simply incoherent as applied to the
* Associate Professor, Stanford Law School. I had the privilege of clerking for Justice
Stewart in 1977-78, along with my co-clerks Barbara Hauser, Bob Litt, and Jay Spears. I am
grateful to the editors of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for giving me this opportu-
nity to offer some personal reflections on that year, and on the work of a man whose contribu-
tions will, I believe, be appreciated all the more with the passage of time. Thanks also to my
colleague Paul Brest for his helpful comments on an earlier draft.
I. Transcript of the Press Conference on the Retirement of Justice Potter Stewart 1
(June 19, 1981) (available in Public Information Office, United States Supreme Court) [herein-
after cited as Retirement Transcript].
2. Bush, In Memory of Justice Potter Stewart, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 171, 172
(1986).
3. Justice Stewart said that "the Constitution and the law" were a judge's only bosses:
"But they can-and should be-very, very strict bosses." Retirement Transcript, supra note 1,
at 16.
4. The Justice was, among many other things, an avid salmon fisherman.
5. See, e.g., Barnett, Goldman & Morris, A Lawyer's Lawyer, A Judge's Judge: Justice
Potter Stewart and the Fourth Amendment, 51 U. CIN. L. Rxv. 509 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
A Lawyer's Lawyer], which is particularly illuminating since it is based in part on several inter-
views with Justice Stewart. Id. at 509 n.l. See also articles cited therein at 515 n.26.
6. Id. at 509.
7. Id. at 541.
8. Id. at 514-15; Cutler, Mr. Justice Stewart: A Personal Reminiscence, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 11, 15 (1981).
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best judicial work.9 His opinions were bold and sweeping when the occa-
sion demanded it,"0 but he was never more impassioned than in defense
of principles of restraint.I1 Restraint, though, like many other things, had
subtle shades of meaning for him that were often not readily perceptible
to others. 
12
For example, his position in the well known battle over incorpora-
tion of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment involved a
subtle interplay of several distinct faces of restraint. On the merits, he
was among those who understood that incorporation was not simply sy-
nonymous with "judicial activism." In the context of the Fourth Amend-
ment, for example, he believed that a principal vice of incorporation was
its tendency to undermine constitutional constraints on federal power by
applying them to state and "big city" police forces, whose difficult law
enforcement problems provided persuasive arguments for limiting consti-
tutional protections.1 3 The position cannot be characterized as either
"activist" or "passivist" since it is both: restraint in reviewing state ac-
tion is necessary in the interests of preserving strong judicial review of
federal action.
But once the battle against incorporation was lost, Justice Stewart
turned the second face of restraint, which demanded faithful adherence
to the precedents of the Court absent the most compelling reasons for
change.14 Rather than insist on his position in separate opinions, he ac-
cepted incorporation of the Fourth Amendment as the authoritative rul-
ing of the Court and became one of the leaders in insisting upon its
complete and vigorous enforcement.15
Indeed, Justice Stewart considered it a "primary duty" of the Court
to produce a clear majority opinion to "guide other courts, lawyers, and
9. See Israel, Potter Stewart in 4 THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1789-1969
2921 (L. Friedman & F. Israel, eds. 1969).
10. See, eg., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Justice Stewart's opinion for the
Court flatly rejected the discredited trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment and overruled
two leading Supreme Court cases on its way to articulating "the cardinal principle the Court
continues to apply to fourth amendment jurisprudence," A Lawyer's Lawyer, supra note 5, at
519-20, that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." 389 U.S. at 351.
11. See A Lawyer's Lawyer, supra note 5, at 512, 539 n.159.
12. See Sandalow, Potter Stewart, 95 HARV. L. REv. 6, 9 (1981).
13. A Lawyer's Lawyer, supra note 5, at 539 n.159. Cf G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUIONAL
LAW 437 (1 1th ed. 1985) (noting that Justice Frankfurter had warned as early as Adamson v.
California, 322 U.S. 46 (1947) that "warped" or diluted interpretations would be a conse-
quence of incorporation).
14. Justice Stewart was so committed to the principle of stare decisis that he often wrote
"impassioned dissents from what he deemed improper overruling of precedents, regardless of
how he had voted in the earlier decision." A Lawyer's Lawyer, supra note 5, at 512 & n.14.
15. See id. at 539.
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the American people,"' 6 and in pursuit of that goal he was the leading
(and sometimes it seemed the only) defender of what might be termed
collegial restraint: he willingly accommodated others when he was the
author of the majority opinion, and resolutely refrained from requesting
changes in the opinions of his brethren. But there was one exception: all
of his clerks learned quickly that whenever the Court struck down a state
law on (for example) Fourth Amendment grounds, the Justice would in-
sist that the opinion read throughout that the Court's action rested on
"the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments." The battle against incor-
poration was lost, but it would not be forgotten. At the end of our clerk-
ship year we gave the Justice a few small and slightly insolent gifts. I
think his favorite was a rubber stamp that read:
"AND THE FOURTEENTH."
This story illustrates, I think, Justice Stewart's complex and subtle
conception of judicial "restraint." It was not an end in itself and not at
all the same as "passivity,"17 but rather a part of the dynamic interac-
tion between the branches of government that is an essential component
of the American liberal tradition.' 8 This delicate balance 9 required flex-
ibility, a light hand in applying both force and restraint, and a sure sense
of when to yield and when to insist on matters of principle.
Justice Stewart was often asked to describe the judicial philosophy
that united a body of work that eluded the standard categories, and he
always replied.in the same vein: that the role of a judge was not to be a
"philosopher king," but simply to decide cases.20 By his own description,
that is all he did for his twenty-three years on the Court. What is re-
markable is that, in the course of simply "doing his best" to decide
cases, 21 guided only by an unshakeable inner compass that pointed in
each case to the proper role for a judge to play in delicate and dynamic
balance of governance, he won the deep respect and profound admiration
of people from all across the political spectrum. Justice Stewart's inner
16. Id. at 511-12.
17. For example, Justice Stewart was by no means timid about overruling outdated prece-
dents, so long as it was done responsibly. See id. at 513. Indeed, notwithstanding his prefer-
ence for clear majority opinions, see supra note 16 and accompanying text, one thing that
would consistently elicit a separate concurrence from him was a Court opinion that dishon-
estly distinguished cases that should have been overruled. A Lawyer's Lawyer, supra note 5, at
513 n.17. See also California v. Texas, 437 U.S. 601 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring).
18. See Sandalow, supra note 12, at 9 (1981). See also Israel, supra note 9, at 2921.
19. It is not surprising that one of the projects Justice Stewart undertook upon his retire-
ment was the television series entitled "The Constitution: That Delicate Balance," produced
by Fred W. Friendly and the Columbia School of Journalism, on which he provided commen-
tary on issues of freedom of speech and of the press.
20. A Lawyer's Lawyer, supra note 5, at 510 n.4, 513-14 n.19.
21. Retirement Transcript, supra note 1, at 22.
176 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 13:173
compass, it seems, pointed almost unerringly toward true judicial
North.22
At a time when the timeless debate over what it means to be a "good
judge" is unusually lively on several fronts23 it seems particularly appro-
priate to reflect again upon the work of a man so widely regarded as "one
of the great ones"24 to see what lessons we can learn. The first, if we take
him at his word, is that we should look at how he decided one particular
case rather than at a developed body of doctrine.25 A small, very sad
case entitled Stump v. Sparkman26 seems to be a suitable text, for in it he
spoke directly and with the deepest conviction on what it means to be
and to act like a judge.
The issue in the case, as stated in the opening line of the majority
opinion, was "the scope of a judge's immunity from damages liability
when sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "27 But behind those sterile words
was a tragic human story. According to the respondents' complaint,28 a
fifteen year old girl, alleged by her mother to be "somewhat retarded"
although she had been regularly promoted at school, had been sterilized
without her consent or even knowledge. She was told by her mother and
the doctor who performed the surgery that she had undergone an appen-
dectomy, and she did not learn the truth until two years later when she
married and tried without success to become pregnant. 29 The doctor,
being no fool, had apparently insisted that the mother not only sign an
22. I mean by this not that his decisions always were, or were universally thought to be,
correct, but rather that even those who disagreed strongly with his decisions had complete
confidence that they were the product of soundjudicial reasoning, not ideology.
23. See, e.g., Kurtz, Reagan Transforms the Federal Judiciary; Conservatives Wield Power-
ful Gavel in Judging Candidates for the Bench, Wash. Post, March 31, 1985, at A4, col. 1;
Turner, Attacks on Chief Justice Pressage Hot '86 Contest, N.Y. Times, March 20, 1985, at
A16, col. 1.
24. Bush, supra note 2, at 172. But Justice Stewart would have had no quarrel with those
who disagree with this assessment, since their standard of judicial greatness is fundamentally
at odds with what he perceived his role to be. As Professor Gunther put it, "He's not going to
be remembered as a great Justice, but that's part of his strength in a way. He was not an
ideologue, not an extremist. They only remember the ones who stake out positions." Surprise
from the Swing Man, Time, June 29, 1981, at 48.
25. His doctrinal contributions have been noted elsewhere. See, e.g., A Lawyer's Lawyer,
supra note 5; White, The Protection of the Individual and the Free Exchange of Ideas: Justice
Potter Stewart's Role in First and Fourth Amendment Cases, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 87 (1985).
26. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
27. Id. at 351.
28. The plaintiffs respondents were Linda Kay Spitler McFarlin, who had been sterilized,
and her husband Leo Sparkman, who sued separately for loss of potential fatherhood. 435
U.S. at 349-51. Because the case reached the Supreme Court on review of a dismissal on the
pleadings, see infra note 34, the Court was required to assume for purposes of the decision
that the allegations were true.
29. Id. at 353.
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indemnity agreement but also secure judicial approval for the surgery,
and so she presented to Judge Harold D. Stump of the DeKalb Circuit
Court a document entitled "Petition to Have Tubal Ligation Performed
on Minor and Indemnity Agreement."30 Judge Stump, being either a
fool or worse, 31 approved the petition on the day it was presented, with-
out notice or a hearing of any kind, or "even the pretext of principled
decision-making. 3, 2 He was sued, along with the doctors, the mother,
and the attorney who had drafted the petition, but he alone was able to
proffer the defense of absolute judicial immunity.
33
To the five members of the majority (and at least one twenty-eight
year old law clerk) the governing precedents left little or no room for
discussion: "'judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not
liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in
excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously
or corruptly.' " A harsh rule to be sure, and one bound to produce
unpleasant results in cases such as this, but a rule long thought necessary
"in the best interests of 'the proper administration of justice .... 1,3,
For Justice Stewart that language was empty of anything but the
cruelest irony if it exonerated Judge Stump in this case. In an opinion
drafted entirely in his own hand,36 and later read aloud from the bench,37
30. Id. at 351.
31. The decision to sterilize another human being, even if done in full accord with law and
due process, may require a streak of hubris, the sin of mortals who pretend to be gods. Given
the scope of their power it is not surprising that this is an all-too-common failing of American
judges. Cf. J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 52 (1978) (judges are among the last repositories in
our society of the "priestly tradition" of looking "continuously at the whole"); P. CAR-
RINGTON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES & COMMENTS ON THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 99
(1969) ("megalomania is an occupational hazard for judges").
32. 435 U.S. at 369 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
33. The District Court had dismissed the suit against all the defendants, holding that
Judge Stump, the only state agent, was absolutely immune from suit. The Seventh Circuit
reversed on the ground that Judge Stump was not immune because he had not acted within his
jurisdiction. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 174-76 (7th Cir. 1977). The Supreme
Court reversed the decision as to Judge Stump without deciding whether this required that the
federal claims against the other defendants also be dismissed. 435 U.S. at 362-64 & n.13.
34. Id. at 354-55, quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872).
35. Id. at 363, quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347.
36. Those who have expressed concern about the impact of "the rise of the law clerk" on
the quality of the judicial product, see, eg., R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 102 (1985),
could find no fault with Justice Stewart's work habits throughout his years on the bench.
Twenty years after he first described his clerks as "a backboard, against which he could bounce
ideas" (and was immediately concerned that they not be offended at the description), see
Sandalow, supra note 12, at 7 n.7, things were very much the same. We drafted opinions, to be
sure, but no one familiar with Justice Stewart's distinctive, pungent and journalistic style could
doubt that each final opinion bore his personal mark. He well understood that young, adept
technicians can make useful but limited contributions to the work of a judge: they can manipu-
late precedent in a skillful but often mechanical way, and they can operate word processors in
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he said:
.... I think that what Judge Stump did on July 9, 1971, was
beyond the pale of anything that could sensibly be called a judicial
act ....
.... [T]he conduct of a judge surely does not become a judicial act
merely on his own say-so. A judge is not free, like a loose cannon,
to inflict indiscriminate damage whenever he announces that he is
acting in his judicial capacity.
The petitioner's brief speaks of "an aura of deism which surrounds
the bench... essential to the maintenance of respect for the judi-
cial institution." Though the rhetoric may be overblown, I do not
quarrel with it. But if aura there be, it is hardly protected by exon-
erating from liability such lawless conduct as took place here. And
if intimidation would serve to deter its recurrence, that surely
would be in the public interest.38
On one level the disagreement between the majority and the dissent-
ers39 could be seen as just another round in the endless rules/standards
debate, and Justice Stewart's opinion could be criticized for failing to
articulate a test with sufficient content to serve the central purposes of
judicial immunity.4° But the standard critique ignores the very special
nature of the issue here: trying to define the essence of the "judicial act"
is an exercise in mind-bending introspection of the sort that almost al-
ways renders courts "understandably inarticulate."41 As Professor Vin-
ing explains, when courts confront issues of jurisdiction and standing, the
much the same fashion (which the Justice found far more impressive-they were then new to
the Court). Since his dissent in Stump required neither of these skills, but rather mature judi-
cial judgment, he drafted it entirely himself-in longhand.
37. Although once a common practice, by 1978 it was very unusual for dissenting opin-
ions to be read aloud from the bench. That Justice Stewart did so in Stump was an indication
of how strongly he felt about the case.
38. 435 U.S. at 365, 367-69 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
39. Justice Stewart's dissent was joined by Justices Marshall and Powell; Justice Powell
also wrote a separate concurrence emphasizing petitioner's "preclusion of any possibility for
the vindication of respondents' rights elsewhere in the judicial system." Id. at 369. Justice
Brennan did not participate.
40. Justice Stewart wrote that "the concept of what is a judicial act must take its content
from a consideration of the factors that support immunity . . ." i.e., the public interest in
allowing judges to decide controversial cases without fear that unsatisfied litigants might
hound them with litigation, consigning the litigants to correction of any error on appeal. He
found "[n]ot one of the[se] considerations ... present here:
There was no "case," controversial or otherwise. There were no litigants. There was
and could be no appeal. And there was not even the pretext of principled decision-
making. The total absence of any of these normal attributes of a judicial proceeding
convinces me that the conduct complained of in this case was not a judicial act.
Id. at 368-69 (emphasis in orginal).
41. J. VINING, supra note 31, at 85. Justice Stewart, whose crisp and elegant writing style
has been often and justly praised, demonstrated what Professor Vining meant when he wrote
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safe, self-constructed home that we recognize as a "case," "is not yet
formed and the legal mind has no home."'42 Without the protection of
the "case," which defines and therefore limits reality to manageable pro-
portions, the judicial mind is left at sea:
Fear may make it too difficult to admit, except by allusion, that
one is swimming in the sea and that one's behavior is a reaction to
it. Denial is a normal defense of the human mind against great
fear; the legal mind is not peculiar in this regard.43
The majority opinion in Stump is the product of this fear and de-
nial-denial of justice in this case out of fear that the genie will not go
back into the bottle in future cases-but it is so much the expected result
that one is led to ask not why the Court exonerated Judge Stump, but
rather why Justice Stewart was able to rise above the fear and struggle to
say, even if "inarticulately," why Judge Stump's conduct was "beyond
the pale of anything that might sensibly be called a judicial act."'
It would be neither sufficient nor accurate to say that he was simply
"deciding this case" and unconcerned about future cases: Justice Stewart
understood better than anyone that the Supreme Court was not in the
business of meting out individual justice, and he was if anything uniquely
concerned about the Court's responsibilty to provide meaningful gui-
dance for future cases.45 This, indeed, was his special genius: balancing
the need for doctrinal clarity against the reality that doctrine must be
applied in a richly complicated world that will not yield up all its secrets
to even the most determined and exhaustive analysis.46 His decision in
Stump, I think, offers the glimmer of a clue as to how he was able to
strike this balance so truly and consistently for twenty-three years.
Professor Noonan47 has said in his book Persons and Masks of the
in Stump that "'jurisdiction' is a coat of many colors." 435 U.S. at 367 n.5 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
42. J. ViNING, supra note 31, at 94.
43. Id.
44. 435 U.S. at 365 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
45. See, eg., supra note 16 and accompanying text.
46. As Justice Stewart put it in The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1365, 1393 (1983):
The art of being a judge, if there is such an art, is in announcing clear rules in the
context of... infinitely varied cases, rules that can be understood and observed by
conscientious government officials. If the outcome of fourth amendment cases has
come to be regarded as turning on "technicalities," it is in part because of the inevita-
ble human shortcomings of judges faced with the task of articulating fourth amend-
ment principles applicable in a broad range of situations while doing justice in a
particular case. Most judges do their best, but that is not always good enough.
In Justice Stewart's case, it generally was.
47. Now Judge Noonan of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
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Law that the first important insight he gleaned from studying "the alli-
ance of law and history" is "the central place of the human person in any
account of law." The second was the persistent "neglect of the person by
legal casebooks, legal histories, and treatises of jurisprudence." The two
combined led to this conclusion: "Neglect of persons, it appeared, had
led to the worst sins for which American lawyers were accountable."4
That is a sin that Justice Stewart never committed, and that, I think, was
the magnet that kept his inner compass fixed on "true judicial North:"
he was always able to see the persons behind the masks of the law.
The majority in Stump saw only the masks. Not only Judge Stump,
who wore the iron mask of judicial power, but all the other players as
well appear only as roles, two-dimensional characters frozen in a tragic
play: Doctor, Mother, Difficult Teenage Daughter. The law provided
numerous categories within which the conduct of these characters could
easily be labelled "normal."'49
But for Justice Stewart this was pure nonsense. He, unlike the ma-
jority, was able to see the persons behind the legal masks. The titles of
"judge" and "mother" could not by their own force make "normal" con-
duct that any sane person would see as outrageous. The analogy he
chose to illustrate the point is graphic:
It can safely be assumed that the Court is correct in concluding
that Mrs. McFarlin came to Judge Stump with her petition because
he was a County Circuit Court Judge. But false illusions as to a
judge's power can hardly convert a judge's response to those illu-
sions into a judicial act. In short, a judge's approval of a mother's
petition to lock her daughter in the attic would hardly be a judicial
act simply because the mother had submitted her petition to the
judge in his official capacity."0
Very pithy, you may say, but what about the attic that happens to
belong to a state-approved home care provider for mildly disturbed teen-
agers? What about that old Pandora's box of "next cases" waiting out
there, threatening to engulf the courts and hamstring judicial indepen-
dence? Always a fair question, I think the Justice might have replied, but
if your decision in this case rests on nothing other than fear of the next
case, you are no longer manipulating doctrine, you are being manipu-
lated by it. If you allow yourself to be ruled by fear of the unknown and
unknowable future, you will either become completely paralyzed x or,
48. J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW vii (1976).
49. 435 U.S. at 362, 365.
50. 435 U.S. at 367 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
5 1. Justice Stewart often said that the most destructive disability a judge can suffer is the
inability to decide. He had seen a number of judges become simply paralyzed by the magni-
tude of the responsibility they felt they had to carry. Cf. P. CARRINGTON, supra note 31, at 99
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worse yet, dominated by doctrine so divorced from humanity that it be-
comes a source of evil rather than of justice. If you cannot see that Judge
Stump's conduct does not deserve the protection of judicial immunity, in
short, you have lost sight of the people whose pain is the only basis on
which a court may act.52
Does it all boil down then, to the "byzantine beauty of... the com-
mon law method, [a process] of reaching what instinctively seem the
right results in a series of cases, and only later... enunciating the princi-
ple that explains the pattern-a sort of connect-the-dots exercise?"
53
There was certainly a strong element of that approach in Justice Stew-
art's work,54 but only, I think, when he was convinced that all good-
faith efforts to reconcile "neutral principles" with messy reality had
failed. When that point was reached, the Court's paramount duty was to
decide the case before it correctly: the mistaken notion that neatness
counts more than justice can lead only to disaster.5
A well-worn cliche might come to mind at this point: "hard cases
make bad law." But what allowed Justice Stewart to rise above both
cliche and fear was his insistence that both the individual result and the
broad doctrine announced in any case must make sense in terms of the
("a judge exercising sole responsibility for all decisions would soon come to find the office
unbearable"). He himself was no stranger to the "agonizing tensions" of the decision process,
see A Lawyer's Lawyer, supra note 5, at 541 n.167, but he had learned in the highly charged
atmosphere of his first term on the Court, during which he cast the "deciding vote" in many
significant cases, id. at 510, never to view himself as the "deciding" vote: after all, it took four
other votes to put him in that position.
52. For those who think that the focus on personal harm is an anachronism in the context
of modem "public law" adjudication, see generally J. VINING, supra note 31, perhaps Stump
illustrates that the "conceptual shift" in our thinking about the proper role of courts has come
at a very high price if it causes courts to lose touch with individual justice, which they alone
are charged to protect. Cf. id. at 36.
53. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT 54 (1980).
54. See id. at 122-24 (discussing Justice Stewart's proposed "in-between" standard for
reapportionment cases); Israel, supra note 9, at 2929-34. I deliberately omit another famous
reference of which the Justice had grown well weary. See Powell, Justice Stewart, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 2 & n.4. (1981).
55. His opinion for the Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483 (1971),
provides one of the clearest applications of this principle:
Of course, it would be nonsense to pretend that our decision today reduces
Fourth Amendment law to complete order and harmony. The decisions of the Court
over the years point in differing directions and differ in emphasis. No trick of logic
will make them all perfectly consistent. But it is no less nonsense to suggest ... that
we have "abandoned any attempt" to find reasoned distinctions in this area. The
time is long past when men believed that development of the law must always pro-
ceed by the smooth incorporation of new situations into a single coherent analytical
framework. We need accept neither the "clarity and certainty" of a Fourth Amend-
ment without a warrant requirement nor the facile consistency obtained by wholesale
overruling of recently decided cases.
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people whose lives it would govern. It is no accident that one of his most
important and sweeping doctrinal contributions shifted the entire focus
of fourth amendment inquiry to "people, not places."56
It is worth asking how it was that Justice Stewart was able to main-
tain his consistent focus on the persons behind the masks and to resist the
rigid rule-mindedness that seems to afflict so many judges. The answer, I
think, may lie in the sense of sanity and balance I noted at the outset,
which was reflected in his decision to retire.
Judges, more than most of us, engage in a daily creative process of
defining the world in which they function, and in so doing they define
themselves. In Professor Vining's terms, a judge "personifies" both him-
self and the litigants every time he decides that there is a justiciable
"case" before him.5 7 It seems to me that, in order to see the persons
behind the masks before him, the judge must first be able to see the per-
son inside the role of judge: to see that there is a person separate from
the role, and to know where one begins and the other ends. The role of
"judge" has no content other than raw power, and a judge who has sub-
merged his or her inner self in that professional identity is in danger of
becoming a caricature, a stick figure devoid of the inner spirit needed to
infuse that power with wisdom and, worse yet, incapable of separating
personal predilections from the public values he is charged with enforc-
ing:"8 in Justice Stewart's words, a "loose cannon" inflicting "indiscrimi-
nate damage" with every empty "judicial act."59
In short, if there is no person separate from the identity imparted by
the judge's robes-no fisherman, father, poet, or mother-then all the
players will wear masks as false as the judge's, and the law will be a false
and lifeless thing. It takes a complete person to fill the role without being
consumed by it, and to understand that one who serves the law does not
56. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). See supra note 10.
57. J. VINING, supra note 31, at 2.
58. The designedly vague terminology is intended to bypass the question of where the
judge is to find "public values," which poses different problems in different contexts. See, e.g.,
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 43-72 (1980) (on the futility of attempting to discover
"fundamental values" in constitutional law); J. VINING, supra note 31, at 171-72 (on the diffi-
cult necessity of recognizing emergent "public values" in administrative law); Yeazell, From
Group Litigation to Class Action Part IL Interest, Class and Representation, 27 UCLA L. REV.
1067, 1109 (1980) (on the ability of judges to determine, as "part of the ideological baggage of
every member of a society," when "group interests" exist and are adequately represented in a
class action). My concern here is the different and perhaps prior question of the judges's
tempermental capacity for separating personal from public values, and deferring to the latter,
at least when they are fairly discernable. I am suggesting, in short, that it is far easier for a
judge to say that this is what he must do than to deliver on it, as Justice Stewart consistently
did. See A Lawyer's Lawyer, supra note 5, at 514.
59. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 367 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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become it. Justice Stewart was such a man, and for his entire career,
including and following his retirement from the Court, he served the
"very strict bosses" of the Constitution and the law very well indeed. He
will be missed.

